Differential privacy is a rigorous privacy standard that has been applied to a range of data analysis tasks. To broaden the application scenarios of differential privacy when data records have dependencies, the notion of Bayesian differential privacy has been recently proposed. However, it is unknown whether Bayesian differential privacy preserves three nice properties of differential privacy: sequential composability, parallel composability, and post-processing. In this paper, we provide an affirmative answer to this question; i.e., Bayesian differential privacy still have these properties. The idea behind sequential composability is that if we have m algorithms Y1, Y2, . . . , Ym, where Y is independently -Bayesian differential private for = 1, 2, . . . , m, then by feeding the result of Y1 into Y2, the result of Y2 into Y3, and so on, we will finally have an m =1 -Bayesian differential private algorithm. For parallel composability, we consider the situation where a database is partitioned into m disjoint subsets. The -th subset is input to a Bayesian differential private algorithm Y , for = 1, 2, . . . , m. Then the parallel composition of Y1, Y2, . . ., Ym will be max m =1 -Bayesian differential private. The postprocessing property means that a data analyst, without additional knowledge about the private database, cannot compute a function of the output of a Bayesian differential private algorithm and reduce its privacy guarantee.
I. INTRODUCTION
Differential privacy by Dwork et al. [1] , [2] is a robust privacy standard that has been used in a range of data analysis tasks, since it provides a rigorous The author Jun Zhao obtained his PhD from Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA, where he was with the Cybersecurity Lab (CyLab). He was a postdoctoral scholar with Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85281, USA. He is now a research fellow at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. Email: junzhao@alumni.cmu.edu 2017 IEEE 28th Annual International Symposium on Personal, Indoor, and Mobile Radio Communications (PIMRC): Special Session SP-04 on "Resource-Efficient, Reliable and Secure Internet of Things in the 5G Era" 978-1-5386-3531-5/17/$31.00 c 2017 IEEE foundation for defining and preserving privacy. Differential privacy has received considerable attention in the literature [3] - [8] . Apple has incorporated differential privacy into its mobile operating system iOS 10 [9] . Google has implemented a differentially private tool called RAPPOR in the Chrome browser to collect information about clients [10] . A randomized algorithm Y satisfies -differential privacy if for any adjacent databases x and x differing in one record, and for any event E, it holds that
where P[·] denotes the probability throughout this paper. Intuitively, under differential privacy, an adversary given access to the output does not have much confidence to determine whether it was sampled from the probability distribution generated by the algorithm when the database is x or when the database is x .
Despite the powerfulness of differential privacy, it has recently been observed by Kifer and Machanavajjhala [11] (see also [12] - [18] ) that differential privacy may not work as expected when the data tuples have dependencies. To extend differential privacy when data tuples have dependencies, Yang et al. [19] introduce the notion of Bayesian differential privacy as follows. For a database x with n tuples, let i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} be a tuple index in the database and K ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} \ {i} be a tuple index set. An adversary denoted by A(i, K) knows the values of all tuples in K (denoted by x K ) and attempts to attack the value of tuple i (denoted by x i ). For a randomized mechanism Y = P[y ∈ Y | x] on database x, the Bayesian differential privacy leakage (BDPL) of Y with respect to the adversary
The mechanism Y satisfies -Bayesian differential privacy if BDPL A(i,K) (Y ) ≤ for any A(i, K).
In this paper, we formally show that similar to differential privacy, Bayesian differential privacy has the following nice properties: sequential composability, parallel composability, and post-processing, as detailed below [1] , [21] . The idea behind sequential composability is that if we have m algorithms Y 1 , Y 2 , . . . , Y m , where Y is independently -Bayesian differential private for = 1, 2, . . . , m, then by feeding the re-sult of Y 1 into Y 2 , the result of Y 2 into Y 3 , and so on, we will finally have an m =1 -Bayesian differential private algorithm. For parallel composability, we consider the situation where a database is partitioned into m disjoint subsets. The -th subset is input to a Bayesian differential private algorithm Y , for = 1, 2, . . . , m. Then the parallel composition of Y 1 , Y 2 , . . ., Y m will be max m =1 -Bayesian differential private. The post-processing property means that a data analyst, without additional knowledge about the private database, cannot compute a function of the output of a Bayesian differential private algorithm and reduce its privacy guarantee.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the results on the sequential composability, parallel composability, and post-processing properties of Bayesian differential privacy. We elaborate their proofs in Sections III. Section IV surveys related work, and Section V concludes the paper.
II. THE RESULTS
We prove that similar to differential privacy, the notion of Bayesian differential privacy has the following properties: sequential composability, parallel composability, and post-processing.
A. Sequential composability
The idea behind sequential composability is that if we have m algorithms which are each independently Bayesian differential private, we would like to feed the results from the first into the second, and so on, without completely sacrificing privacy. Sequential composability allows us to do this.
Theorem 1 (Sequential composability). Let x be the database. For = 1, 2, . . . , m, suppose a represents an auxiliary input or intermediate output of an algorithm. We have m algorithms Y (x, a ) for = 1, 2, . . . , m. Furthermore, assume that Y is independently -Bayesian differential private for = 1, 2, . . . , m. Consider a sequence of computations
where the expression here is general enough to cover all cases regardless whether the input of Y for = 1, 2, . . . , m may or may not include partial or all outputs
We show Theorem 1 in Section III.
B. Parallel composability
Now we consider the situation where a single database is partitioned into m disjoint subsets. Each subset is input to a Bayesian differential private algorithm. Then we consider the parallel composition of the m algorithms. Specifically, we present the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (Parallel composability). Let x be the database whose tuples are indexed from 1 to n. Let H 1 , H 2 , . . ., H m be a partition of the index set {1, 2, . . . , n}. For = 1, 2, . . . , m, suppose a represents an auxiliary input or intermediate output of an algorithm. We have m algorithms Y (x H , a ) for = 1, 2, . . . , m. Furthermore, assume that Y is independently -Bayesian differential private for = 1, 2, . . . , m. Consider a sequence of computations
. . ||y m for y 1 , y 2 , . . ., y m defined above, where "||" means concatenation. Then Y achieves max m =1 -Bayesian differential privacy.
Theorem 2 will be proved in the full version [20] due to space limitation.
C. Post-Processing
Similar to differential privacy, our Bayesian differential privacy is also immune to post-processing: A data analyst, without additional knowledge about the private database, cannot compute a function of the output of a Bayesian differential private algorithm and reduce its privacy guarantee. Specifically, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3 (Post-Processing). Let Y be an -Bayesian differential private algorithm. Let Z be an arbitrary randomized mapping (Z sees the output of Y , but not the database)
We establish Theorem 3 in the full version [20] due to space limitation.
III. PROOFS
In this section, we prove the theorems. Without loss of generality, we consider discrete outputs so we use probability P [·] below. If the output is continuous, we just replace probability P [·] with probability density function F [·], and the proof follows accordingly. We introduce some notation as follows. The database under consideration is modeled by a random variable X = [X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n ], where X j for each j ∈ {1, . . . , n} is a tuple, which is also a random variable.
Let database x = [x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ] be an instantiation of X, so that each x j denotes an instantiation of X j . An adversary denoted by A(i, K) knows the values of all tuples in K (denoted by x K ) and attempts to attack the value of tuple i (denoted by x i ). We define K := {1, 2, . . . , n} \ {i} \ K. Then for a randomized mechanism Y = P[y ∈ Y | x] on database x, we write
For an index set S, we group x j (resp., X j ) for j ∈ S and write x S (resp., X S ). Hence, the Bayesian differential privacy leakage (BDPL) of Y with respect to the adversary
The mechanism Y satisfies -Bayesian differential privacy if BDPL A(i,K) (Y ) ≤ for any A(i, K), where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and K ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} \ {i}.
Proof of Theorem 1:
We have z m as the output of algorithm Y . Then we consider P Y (x i , x K , X K ) = z m so that i is the index of the tuple to be protected by the mechanism (i.e., inferred by the adversary), where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, K ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} \ {i},
. By the law of total probability, it follows that
Now we consider the scenario where x i in the database is replaced by x i . Since Y is -Bayesian differential private for = 1, 2, . . . , m, we obtain for
Replacing x i by x i in (1), we get
Finally, (4) and (5) together imply the desired result
We can show (6) for any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, K ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n}\{i},
Hence, the mechanism Y is m =1 -Bayesian differential private. Proofs of Theorems 2 and 3: Due to space limitation, we establish Theorems 2 and 3 in the full version [20] .
IV. RELATED WORK
The notion of differential privacy [1] , [2] provides a rigorous foundation for privacy protection. Intuitively, differential privacy implies that changing one entry in the database does not significantly change the query output, so that an adversary, seeing the query output and even knowing all records except the one to be inferred, draws almost the same conclusion on whether or not a record is in the database. Differential privacy is shown to satisfy the properties of sequential composability, parallel composability, and post-processing [1] , [21] . Recently, Kairouz et al. [22] investigate the overall privacy cost for the composition of differential private algorithms. Their result improves those in prior work [1] , [2] , [23] , [24] .
Although differential privacy has received considerable interest in the literature [25] - [35] , it has been observed by Kifer and Machanavajjhala [11] (see also [12] - [18] ) that differential privacy may not work as expected when the data tuples have dependencies. To extend differential privacy for correlated data, prior studies have investigated various privacy metrics [13] - [18] , [36] . One of the metrics receiving much attention is the notion of Bayesian differential privacy introduced by Yang et al. [19] . Yang et al. [19] further present a mechanism that is only for the sum query on a Gaussian Markov random field with positive correlations and its extension to a discrete domain. In contrast, Zhao et al. [12] propose mechanisms to achieve Bayesian differential privacy for any query on databases with arbitrary tuple correlations.
Kifer and Machanavajjhala [15] generalize differential privacy to the Pufferfish framework, which takes into consideration the generation of the database and the adversarial belief about the database. Li et al. [37] propose membership privacy in consideration of the adversary's prior beliefs as well. He et al. [14] study a subclass of the Pufferfish framework, named the Blowfish framework, which uses deterministic policy constraints instead of probabilistic correlations to specify adversarial knowledge about the database. Very recently, Song et al. [17] propose a general mechanism to achieve Pufferfish privacy. Song and Chaudhuri [7] further show composition Properties of Pufferfish privacy for timeseries data. Zhu et al. [18] leverage linear relationships among tuples, but this approach does not satisfy any rigorous privacy metric. Liu et al. [16] present a Laplace mechanism that handles pairwise correlations. Xiao and Xiong [27] address differential privacy under temporal correlations in the context of location privacy. Kasiviswanathan and Smith [26] introduce the notion of semantic privacy by modeling the external knowledge via a prior probability distribution, and modeling conclusions via the corresponding posterior distribution.
Dwork and Rothblum [38] recently proposed the notion of concentrated differential privacy, a relaxation of differential privacy enjoying better accuracy than differential privacy without compromising on cumulative privacy loss over multiple computations. Motivated by [38] , Bun and Steinke [39] suggest a relaxation of concentrated differential privacy. Jorgensen et al. [40] introduce a new privacy definition called personalized differential privacy, a generalization of differential privacy in which users specify a personal privacy requirement for their data.
V. CONCLUSION
Bayesian differential privacy has been recently proposed to broaden the application scenarios of differential privacy when data records have dependencies. In this paper, we formally show that Bayesian differential privacy preserves three nice properties of differential privacy: sequential composability, parallel composability, and post-processing.
